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This paper highlights the rationale for exclusive territories in a model of repeated interaction between competing supply 
chains. We show that with observable contracts exclusive territories have two countervailing effects on manufacturers' 
incentives to sustain tacit collusion. First, granting local monopolies to retailers distributing a given brand softens inter- and 
intrabrand competition in a one-shot game. Hence, punishment profits are larger, thereby rendering deviation more profitable. 
Second, exclusive territories stifle deviation profits because retailers of competing brands can adjust their pricing decisions to 
the wholesale contract offered by a deviant manufacturer, whilst intrabrand competition prevents such `instantaneous 
reaction'. We show that the latter effect tends to dominate the former, whereby making exclusive territories a more suitable 
organizational mode to sustain upstream cooperation. These insights carry over when manufacturers voluntarily decide 
whether to disclose contracts and can change the distribution mode every period; moreover, they strengthen under imperfect 
intrabrand competition. Finally, we extend the model to allow for retailers' service investments. Here a novel effect emerges 
under exclusive territories: a retailer of the deviant manufacturer increases its service investment as a response to a lower 
wholesale price. This renders deviation more profitable, thereby softening the pro-collusive effect of exclusive territories. 
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Distribution networks organized through exclusive territories are widespread in many markets.
In industries such as lodging, computer services or maintenance services, upstream ﬁrms use
franchise contracts that predominantly grant the franchisee an exclusive territorial area in which
the franchisor commits not to add competing outlets.1 Car distribution in the U.S. as well as in
Europe, distribution of beverages, and many other retail industries, feature the same pattern.2
Several existing models rationalize the extensive use of exclusive territories by arguing that they
provide retailers with the right incentives to invest in services that would otherwise be eroded by
intrabrand competition—see e.g., Mathewson and Winter (1984 and 1994). However, exclusive
territories not only aﬀect the way manufacturers and retailers behave within a single supply
chain, but they also induce strategic eﬀects on competing brands. As pointed out by Rey and
Stiglitz (1995), softening intrabrand competition via exclusive territories also mitigates competi-
tion coming from substitute brands through a ‘strategic eﬀect’: absent intrabrand competition,
distributors of a given product can increase their retail prices if competing brands sell at higher
wholesale prices. This spurs downstream proﬁts and, therefore, the surplus that manufacturers
can extract via franchise fees. Although these eﬀects are crucial to judge the impact of exclusive
territories on manufacturers’ proﬁts as well as on retail prices, they are relatively unexplored. In
particular, to the best of our knowledge, besides Rey and Stiglitz (1995) there is no other paper
analyzing the role of exclusive territories in a model of competing supply chains.3
In addition, the existing literature has mainly taken a static approach, and has thus neglected
the eﬀects that limits on intrabrand competition have on repeated interactions between compet-
ing manufacturers. However, exclusive territories appear to be common in industries where few
large producers compete for a long time. For example, Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo, the
two leading producers of non-alcoholic beverages, control a very large market share in this seg-
ment.4 Both these producers grant exclusive territories to their bottling companies, who sell and
distribute the bottled beverages to ﬁnal retailers. Another example is the hotel business in which
only few big players like InterContinental Hotels Group, Wyndham Hotel Group and Marriott
International (the three biggest companies) control a large share of the market in many cities or
districts and grant exclusive territories to their franchisees.
Arguably, all these companies do not compete on a purely static perspective, but likely base
their pricing behavior on dynamic considerations, that is, lowering their prices today may trigger
1For example, Azoulay and Shane (2001) document that more than 80% of franchisors among many diﬀerent
industries adopt exclusive territories.
2See, for example, Brenkers and Verboven (2006) for an in-depth study of European car dealerships and Cul-
bertson and Bradford (1991), Jordan and Jaﬀe (1987) and Sass and Saurman (1993 and 1996) for detailed studies
of beer distribution in the U.S..
3As we will mention in the literature review, Iyer (1998) considers a model of competition between manufacturers
but he focuses on pure interbrand competition, i.e., each retailer has an exclusive territory. Thus, his model does
not allow for a comparison of exclusive versus non-exclusive territories.
4As reported by Fosfuri and Giarratana (2009), between 1999 and 2003 the two ﬁrms controlled more than 75%
of the carbonated soft drink market in the U.S..
2a price reduction by competitors in the future. For example, Fosfuri and Giarratana (2009)
point out that Coca-Cola and Pepsi have often avoided direct price competition and that price
adjustments by one brand are usually followed immediately by the other. Taken together, these
are telltale things that tacit collusion is relevant in markets with these features.
Building on these considerations, the objective of this paper is to identify the link between
restrictions on intra- and interbrand competition and the incentives to achieve cooperative out-
comes in a repeated game where manufacturers control the organizational strategies of the supply
chain. We are interested in understanding what new trade-oﬀs exclusive territories bring about
in a dynamic game. What is the role that the strategic eﬀect plays in a framework where tacit
collusion can be enforced through repeated interactions? Do exclusive territories facilitate tacit
collusion between upstream ﬁrms? What is the role of information sharing agreements among
competing vertical chains in such a dynamic setting? How does the interplay between retailers’
service provision and strategic price considerations inﬂuence collusion incentives?
To address these issues we ﬁrst set up a simple repeated game extending the static analysis
of Rey and Stiglitz (1995): two inﬁnitely-lived manufacturers, each producing a single brand,
compete by oﬀering observable two-part tariﬀs and choose whether to grant exclusive territories or
allow for intrabrand competition.5 Within this framework, we show that exclusive territories have
two opposing eﬀects on upstream collusion. On the one hand, the static analysis suggests that
cooperative outcomes between manufacturers should be harder to sustain under arrangements
that remove intrabrand competition. This is because exclusive territories increase proﬁts along
the punishment phase when manufacturers punish deviations with grim-trigger strategies. On the
other hand, we demonstrate that a new countervailing eﬀect kicks in with repeated interaction.
When both manufacturers impose exclusive territories, retailers of a given brand can react on
the deviation of a deviant manufacturer directly in the time period of deviation. They do so by
optimally changing their retail price decisions, whereby reducing the spot gain from deviation.
This instantaneous ‘punishment’ mechanism is no longer at work without exclusive territories:
retailers cannot tailor their pricing decisions to the wholesale contract oﬀered by the competing
manufacturer when facing intrabrand competition. Hence, exclusive territories reduce deviation
proﬁts relative to arrangements allowing for intrabrand competition.
Understanding which of these forces dominates is not an obvious question. One might argue
that the eﬀect of exclusive territories on the deviation proﬁt is only of second order relative to
the impact that these arrangements have on the punishment proﬁt. While the strength of the
former eﬀect relies solely on the retailers’ reaction to a deviation along the best-reply function,
5Public contracts is a somewhat compelling assumption in industries where manufacturers can easily engage
into information sharing agreements. For instance, in business-format franchising franchisors must give a ‘franchise
disclosure document’ that includes, among other things, the franchise fee and the royalty rate to a potential
franchisee ten business days before signing any contract (see Federal Trade Commission, title 16, chapter 1,
subchapter D, part 436). Of course, there are industries where this is not enough to perfectly disclose a franchisee’s
costs since there are other deals between a franchisor and a franchisee that are not observable to outsiders, e.g.,
franchisors often sell ingredients and supplies to their franchisees at prices unknown to outsiders. However, even
in these cases royalty rates are usually a key determinant of franchisees’ costs.
3the latter also entails a reaction by the rival manufacturer. Our analysis suggests that this
conjecture is incorrect and that the net eﬀect is usually unclear. Moreover, in the standard linear
demand model—and more generally when the second-order derivatives of the demand function
are small—we show that the deviation eﬀect is invariably stronger than the punishment eﬀect,
whereby making collusion easier to sustain when both manufacturers impose exclusive territories.
This result adds to the existing literature on collusion and vertical restraints. In particular,
although both eﬀects described above are also present in Nocke and White’s (2007) model of
collusion and vertical integration, our analysis delivers diﬀerent predictions relative to theirs.
While Nocke and White (2007) ﬁnd that a single vertical merger suﬃces to facilitate collusion, in
our model the pro-collusive eﬀect of exclusive territories emerges if and only if all manufacturers
impose this distribution mode. Moreover, we show that in our supply chain set-up, vertical
integration does not facilitate collusion over and above intrabrand competition. As a consequence,
exclusive territories are predicted to dominate vertical integration for collusive purposes. We also
show that the same consideration applies to resale price maintenance.
The results of the baseline model extend to several more complex scenarios. First, the in-
troduction of imperfect intrabrand competition brings in a novel eﬀect of exclusive territories.
When retailers dealing with the same manufacturers are diﬀerentiated, a deviant manufacturer
who distributes by way of exclusive territories gains via larger sales of only one retailer and not
of many as would be the case if the manufacturer allowed for intrabrand competition. Thus,
distributing via exclusive territories reduces a manufacturer’s temptation to deviate from a col-
lusive outcome. Essentially, under imperfect intrabrand competition exclusive territories provide
a commitment device for manufacturers to keep the deviation proﬁt low. As a consequence, our
result that exclusive territories facilitate collusion gets strengthened.
Next, to emphasize the key role of communication in supply chains, we study the incentives
for manufacturers to disclose their wholesale contracts. We ﬁrst show that with non-observable
contracts the choice of the distribution channel has no impact on collusion: a neutrality result
that hinges on the absence of the strategic eﬀect. Then we consider an extended model where the
decision of whether to disclose information about wholesale contracts is endogenous and taken
at each stage of the repeated game. It turns out that it is in the manufacturers’ best interest
to exchange information about wholesale contracts: even in the deviation phase upstream ﬁrms
prefer to make their contracts public in order not to give up the beneﬁts of the strategic eﬀect
discussed above. This result shows quite clearly the potential beneﬁts of communication systems
among competing supply chains, a feature which seems widespread in many markets. Indeed,
consistently with our model, information sharing agreements between competing supply chains,
often enforced through suppliers’ trade associations, are common in several industries (see, e.g.,
Briley et al., 1994, or Stern et al., 1996, and the references therein).
To further extend the model and sharpen its predictive value, we also introduce lack of
commitment by considering the case where manufacturers can change their distribution and
4communication strategy at each period of the game.6 We ﬁnd that also in this case exclusive
territories and communication between producers make cooperative outcomes easier to sustain.
In addition, if producers can change their distribution regime, they can threaten to distribute via
non-exclusive territories after a deviation, thereby lowering the proﬁt in the punishment phase
and render such a deviation even less proﬁtable than under commitment.
Finally, to build a bridge between the literature on retailers’ service provision and our repeated
game approach to competition between supply chains, we consider a model where, besides setting
ﬁnal prices, retailers also invest into demand enhancing services. This enriched model allows us
to identify another novel eﬀect of exclusive territories: when a manufacturer deviates by cutting
its wholesale price, his retailer complements this better deal with a higher service level. This
renders deviation more proﬁtable because the deviant manufactures enjoys larger sales overall.
As a consequence, we ﬁnd that collusion is now easier to sustain when manufacturers allow for
intrabrand competition if problems of service provision are important enough. Otherwise, the
pro-collusive eﬀect of exclusive territories carries over. Therefore, we ﬁnd that two features—
competition between supply chains and service provision by retailers—that favor the use of
exclusive territories in a static framework lead to novel eﬀects in a dynamic framework that favor
intrabrand competition.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 relates our contribu-
tion to the earlier literature. Section 3 sets up the baseline model. In Section 4 we characterize
the equilibrium of the baseline model. Section 5 discusses the diﬀerences between exclusive terri-
tories and other common vertical restraints. Section 6 extends the baseline model to the case of
endogenous disclosure of contracts, lack of commitment of the organizational mode and imperfect
intrabrand competition. In Section 7 we analyze investments in service provision by retailers and
Section 8 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
The existing literature on exclusive territories, with the exception of Rey and Stiglitz (1995),
focussed exclusively on the case of a monopolistic manufacturer. Mathewson and Winter (1984
and 1994) were the ﬁrst to show that exclusive territories can create an incentive for retailers to
supply desired services—e.g., product demonstrations or non-observable investments in quality.
With intrabrand competition, each retailer free-rides on the services provided by competitors,
thereby eroding the equilibrium service level. Granting exclusive territories overcomes this free-
riding problem. Drawing on Mathewson and Winter, Klein and Murphy (1988) and Alexander
and Reiﬀen (1995) give precise conditions under which a manufacturer can implement his de-
sired service level. Iyer (1998) explores under which conditions a manufacturer optimally oﬀers
heterogeneous contracts to retailers in order to provide them with the right incentives to: (i)
6A prominent example of a company changing its distribution regime is McDonald’s who moved from exclusive
to non-exclusive territories in 1969.
5invest in services, and (ii) target diﬀerent consumer groups. In an extension, he considers com-
petition between manufacturers and shows, with pure interbrand competition, how this aﬀects
the coordination between price and non-price downstream competition.7
There are several other interesting issues that have been explored in the framework with
a single manufacturer. For example, Dutta et al. (1994) compare exclusive and non-exclusive
territories when bootlegging is allowed—i.e., even under exclusive territories a retailer can sell into
a diﬀerent geographical area. They show that the optimal intensity of bootlegging is positive and
becomes stronger the more important retail services are and the longer the vertical relationship
lasts.8 Desiraju (2004) analyzes the case where retailers are subject to limited liability and
demand is stochastic. Therefore, the manufacturer must adapt the ﬁxed fee to extract surplus.
In this case non-exclusive territories may be optimal despite of the free-riding problem. Chiang et
al. (2003) demonstrate under which conditions it is beneﬁcial for a manufacturer to open an own
retail store in competition to the existing retailer although this may involve self-cannibalization.
They show that this can even beneﬁt the retailer if wholesale prices decrease.9
The issue of competition between manufacturers has been analyzed in the literature dealing
with strategic decentralization in supply chains. The seminal paper by McGuire and Staelin
(1983) considers a model with competition between two manufacturers that charge linear whole-
sale prices and can distribute their products either via an independent retailer or via an inte-
grated structure. They show that the equilibrium distribution outcome depends on the level of
substitutability between the goods. In particular, both manufacturers choosing to be vertically
integrated is always an equilibrium while both choosing decentralization is also an equilibrium
if products are close enough substitutes. Coughlan (1985) extends the analysis of McGuire and
Staelin (1983) by allowing for general demand functions and provides evidence for the results from
the semiconductor industry. Moorthy (1987) explains the intuitions for the results of McGuire
and Staelin (1983) in more detail and extends the analysis to non-constant marginal costs and
complementarity between products. Bonanno and Vickers (1988) consider two-part tariﬀ whole-
sale contracts and show that decentralization is the unique equilibrium in this case. In contrast
to our paper, these models take a static perspective and do not allow for repeated interaction.
On the empirical side, several studies have documented the main eﬀects of exclusive terri-
tories. Using data from manufacturers of industrial machinery and electronic equipment in the
U.S., Dutta et al. (1999) demonstrate that the free-riding problem and the degree of upstream
competition are highly signiﬁcant explanatory variables of why manufacturers grant territorial
7Rey and Tirole (1986) suggest a diﬀerent rationale for exclusive territories, namely that distributors may be
better informed about local market conditions. If distributors compete with each other, they have no market
power and therefore any superior information is lost since the uninformed manufacturer sets the retail price. With
exclusivity the informed distributor sets the price which allows for future segmentation of consumers.
8Nault and Tyagi (2001) consider the problem when customers in one geographical area may buy in another
area but ﬁrms’ investments only aﬀect the demand of their local consumers. They show under which conditions
the optimal agreement between ﬁrms involves transfers or shared ownership.
9For a model that analyzes exclusive territories without the free-riding problem and compares price versus
quantity competition between retailers, see Matsumura (2003).
6exclusivity in these industries.10 Kalnins (2004) used data from the hotel industry in Texas from
1990 to 1999 to quantify the eﬀects of exclusive territories. He ﬁnds that for hotel chains that do
not grant exclusive territories, adding a new hotel within the 10 closest hotels is associated with
a $66 loss per room and has highly negative eﬀects on the franchisee’s proﬁt. Culbertson and
Bradford (1991), Jordan and Jaﬀe (1987) and Sass and Saurman (1993 and 1996) examine the
eﬀects of exclusive territories on beer prices in the U.S.. They ﬁnd that this use leads to an in-
crease in the wholesale and retail price of beer. In addition, they show that if manufacturers can
choose between exclusive or non-exclusive territories, they predominantly use exclusive territo-
ries. Finally, Brenkers and Verboven (2006) evaluate the eﬀects of enhanced competition between
car dealers due to the removal of exclusive territories and exclusive distribution agreements in
the European car market and ﬁnd that car prices fall. However, they also demonstrate that after
the removal almost all car manufacturers chose a distribution system that limits the number of
dealers in order to retain some market power with each of them in the respective geographical
area. In sum, the empirical studies overwhelmingly demonstrate that exclusive territories have
a large impact on retail prices and that competing manufacturers are more likely to choose this
distribution system than an upstream monopolistic.
Given its dynamic perspective, our analysis also adds to the recent and growing literature
on tacit collusion in vertical relationships. Nocke and White (2007) and Normann (2009) an-
alyze whether vertical integration facilitates tacit collusion by comparing an industry with no
integration to one in which one pair of ﬁrms is vertically integrated. Both these papers consider
perfect Bertrand competition upstream. Nocke and White (2007) show that vertical integration
facilitates tacit collusion when upstream ﬁrms compete by setting two-part tariﬀs. Normann
(2009), instead, considers linear prices in the upstream market. He shows that even in this case
similar results obtain although collusion and deviation proﬁts are diﬀerent due to double mar-
ginalization.11 The main eﬀects that drive our results in the baseline model are similar to theirs.
However, diﬀerently from these papers, we are concerned with exclusive territories instead of
vertical integration and show that this practice facilitates collusion if and only if both manufac-
turers distribute via exclusive territories and not just one. In addition, as we show in Section 5,
were manufacturers allowed to vertically integrate to sustain collusion, they have no incentive to
do so but would prefer to distribute via exclusive territories if this is possible.
Jullien and Rey (2007) study the eﬀects of resale price maintenance (RPM) on tacit collusion
in a model with stochastic demand. They ﬁnd that due to demand uncertainty manufacturers
never opt for RPM in a static context but they do so to facilitate collusion. The reason is
that RPM reduces the punishment proﬁt and, in addition, it also allows for an easier detection
of deviations. Hence, the main diﬀerence between our paper and Jullien and Rey (2007) is
that while the anticompetitive role of exclusive territories works through the deviation proﬁt, in
10Frazier and Lassar (1996) also ﬁnd for products used in business-to-business markets that distributing via
exclusive territories is positively correlated to the degree of competition at the upstream level.
11For an experimental investigation of the eﬀects of vertical mergers on ﬁnal good prices when upstream ﬁrms
compete for a long but ﬁnite time period, see Normann (2007).
7their framework RPM renders collusion easier to sustain mainly because it makes detection and
punishments more eﬀective. As for vertical integration, we show that also RPM does not improve
manufacturers ability to collude over and above non-exclusive territories in our framework.
Finally, in a model without exclusive territories but with public contracts, Schinkel et al.
(2008) show that upstream collusion requires low wholesale prices and possibly negative franchise
fees when the bargaining power is in the suppliers’ hand. By focusing on the polar case of
buyer power Piccolo (2010) ﬁnds similar results. There is one key diﬀerence between these two
papers and ours. While we are interested in the interplay between organizational and contractual
strategies to sustain cooperative outcomes, they focus mainly on the optimal contracting aspect.
3 The Baseline Model
Players and environment: Consider a game where two manufacturers, each denoted by Mi,
i = 1,2, compete by selling imperfect substitute goods (brands) through independent retailers.
The downstream technology is one-to-one, and brand i’s ﬁnal demand is Di (pi,pj), which depends
on the retail price pi as well as on the retail price of the competing brand pj. Manufacturers and
retailers have linear cost functions with marginal costs normalized to zero. As in Rey and Stiglitz
(1995), each manufacturer can organize his distribution network in two alternative manners. He
can impose exclusive territories—i.e., grant his retailers exclusivity in the geographical area
in which potential consumers reside. Alternatively, the manufacturer can allow for intrabrand
competition by letting his retailers compete. Since in this regime dealers of one manufacturer
distribute the same brand in a territory, they are in perfect Bertrand competition to each other.
Contracts and observability: Manufacturers make take-it-or-leave-it-oﬀers to their retailers
and compete by oﬀering two-part tariﬀs. A contract Ci = (wi,Ti) speciﬁes a wholesale price wi
charged to all retailers distributing brand i and a franchise fee Ti that these must pay to Mi.12
We assume that contracts are uniform within the same brand, that is, all retailers dealing with
Mi get the same contract. This symmetry hypothesis is without loss of generality and is imposed
for arbitrage reasons as in Rey and Stiglitz (1995). It reﬂects the implicit assumption that resale
on the downstream market prevents manufacturers from oﬀering diﬀerent wholesale trade rules
to identical retailers. It also rules out non-constant per-unit wholesale prices, whereby justifying
our focus on two-part tariﬀs.
In the baseline model we assume that contracts are observable before the retail competition
stage, as is done by e.g., Rey and Stiglitz (1995) and Iyer (1998). This can be the case, for
instance, due to mandatory disclosure rules.13 Nevertheless, there are other industries where
12Two-part tariﬀs are the established praxis in most industries. For example, Lafontaine (1992) and Kalnins
(2004) report that around 90% of business format franchising contracts consist of an up-front payment and a
royalty rate on sales.
13As mentioned, these rules may help manufacturers to draw some inference on the contracts oﬀered by rivals.
Also, as Lafontaine and Shaw (1999) report, the prices in franchising contracts appear to be very stable over time,
i.e., around 75% of franchisors never changed their royalty rate or franchise fee over a 13-year time period. This
8producers have discretion about disclosing their contracts like in automobile distribution. In
these instances, manufacturers can make wholesale contracts public, for example via information
sharing agreements and/or strategic alliances. In practice, syndicates and suppliers’ trade as-
sociations may facilitate the dissemination of information among competing supply chains, see,
e.g. Stern et al. (1996).14 In order to capture this feature, in Section 4 we consider private
contracts and then extend the baseline model so as to encompass the case where information
sharing among competing supply chains is voluntary and taken at every stage of the game.
It is important to note that our results will not hinge on the assumption that franchise fees
are observable, but they also hold when only wholesale prices are observable.15 We explain this
in more detail in the next section. For consistency with the earlier literature, in the following we
assume that contract observability refers to both wholesale prices and franchise fees.
Timing: Consider an inﬁnitely repeated game with discrete time, τ = 0,..,+∞. Following
Nocke and White (2007) and Jullien and Rey (2007), assume that manufacturers are inﬁnitely
lived and discount future proﬁts at the same rate δ ∈ (0,1), whereas retailers are short-lived and
thus maximize their spot proﬁts. Our analysis extends to the arguably more realistic situation
where manufacturers are not able to make long-term commitments and retailers are too short-
sighted to collude at their level.
The sequence of events within the stage game unfolds as follows:
T=1 (Contracting): Manufacturers simultaneously oﬀer wholesale contracts. Oﬀers are
secret at this stage.
T=2 (Acceptance): Retailers (simultaneously) decide whether to accept the received oﬀers
without knowing what oﬀer has been made to rival retailers. In case of rejection they enjoy an
outside option, which we normalize to zero for simplicity.
T=3 (Contract disclosure): Wholesale contracts become common knowledge.
T=4 (Competition): Retailers set prices and the market clears—i.e., ﬁnal demands mate-
rialize and input orders are placed. Contract obligations are executed.
This particular timing is standard in the literature—see, e.g., Bonanno and Vickers (1988) or
Rey and Stiglitz (1995).16 It captures those instances where information about actual contracts
can be credibly disseminated only after these oﬀers are accepted. In practice, this communication
implies that obtaining such information once may allow to draw good inference on future prices.
14An important trend in distribution is the growth of information-intensive channels. These are usually charac-
terized by channel partners who invest in bundles of sophisticated information technology like telecommunication
and satellite linkages, bar coding and electronic scanning systems, database management systems etc.
15We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
16Allowing for a timing where retailers observe the wholesale oﬀer made by the rival manufacturer already at
the acceptance stage is unusual in the literature. Such a timing would imply for instance that manufacturers’
contracts and retailers’ acceptance strategies can in principle be contingent on the rivals’ actions. However, this
feature contrasts with what is usually done in practice, and drastically complicates the model even in the stage
game.
9protocol is carried out by external agencies such as trade associations through which ﬁrms usually
share information about demand and costs (wholesale prices in our model).
Tacit collusion: We look for stationary equilibria such that manufacturers maximize their
discounted joint proﬁts. For simplicity, we assume that manufacturers sustain tacit collusion
through inﬁnite Nash reversion, i.e., a deviation by a manufacturer is followed by an inﬁnitely-
repeated play of the equilibrium of the stage game. In contrast, deviations by retailers do not
trigger punishments.
As is common in the literature, we will say that exclusive territories facilitate collusion as long
as they reduce the critical discount factor above which collusion can be sustained. In particular,
the comparison of the diﬀerent distribution regimes will be based on identifying the regime for
which the largest range of discount factors are compatible with the collusive outcome.
Assumptions and equilibrium concept: The analysis will be developed under the following
simplifying assumptions:
A1 The inverse demand function for good i is Pi (qi,qj) = α−βqi−γqj for i = 1,2, where qi is
good i’s total output.17 We assume that α > 0 and β > γ ≥ 0, so that inverting the system
of inverse demand functions yields well behaved (symmetric) direct demand functions
Di (pi,pj) =
α(β − γ) − βpi + γpj
β2 − γ2 for i = 1,2.
Linearity is often imposed in models that study repeated interaction between upstream and
downstream ﬁrms, see, e.g., Schinkel et al. (2008) and Vives (2000). It helps us to make our
point in the simplest possible way.
The next assumption allows to focus on equilibria with positive sales.
A2 Whenever indiﬀerent between accepting a wholesale contract and opting out, retailers ac-
cept the contract and secure input supply.
The equilibrium concept that we use in solving the repeated game is subgame-perfect Nash
Equilibrium (SPNE).
4 Equilibrium Characterization
There are three cases to analyze: (i) both manufacturers impose exclusive territories; (ii) both
allow for intrabrand competition, and (iii) one manufacturer imposes exclusive territories while

















where M is the utility from income. Diﬀerentiating this utility function with respect to qi, i = 1,2, yields the
inverse demand function P
i (qi,qj) = α − βqi − γqj.
10the other one does not. We will analyze each case in turn.
Exclusive Territories
When both manufacturers impose exclusive territories, only interbrand competition matters.
Hence, the proﬁt of a retailer distributing brand i is
πi (pi,pj) = Di(pi,pj)(pi − wi) − Ti.
Maximizing this function with respect to pi yields the system of ﬁrst-order conditions18
∂Di (pi,pj)
∂pi
(pi − wi) + Di (pi,pj) = 0, i = 1,2. (1)
The solution of these equations yields the equilibrium of the retail game, i.e., the price functions
pi (wi,wj) (i = 1,2). It is evident that this equilibrium is unaﬀected if ﬁxed fees are not observable
to retailers since the optimal retail price only depends on own and rival wholesale price.
We can now solve the upstream game. Using backward induction, Mi maximizes the proﬁt
Πi (wi,wj) = Di (pi (wi,wj),pj (wj,wi))wi + Ti,
subject to the retailer’s participation constraint
Di (pi (wi,wj),pj (wj,wi))(pi (wi,wj) − wi) − Ti ≥ 0. (2)
Clearly, (2) is satisﬁed as equality at equilibrium. Hence, Mi’s optimization program is
max
wi
Di (pi (wi,wj),pj (wi,wj))pi (wj,wi).
The symmetric Nash equilibrium of the upstream game, wN
ET, is then deﬁned by the following












∂wi | {z }
pi (.)
strategic eﬀect
= 0, i = 1,2. (3)
The ﬁrst term in (3) is the standard marginal revenue expression, i.e., each manufacturer inter-
nalizes the eﬀect that a change in his wholesale price has on the ﬁnal demand through the retail
price, and thus on the sales proﬁt. The second term reﬂects a strategic eﬀect: when choosing
the wholesale price, each manufacturer anticipates the competing retailers’ reaction in the re-
tail market, and the resulting eﬀect on his own product’s demand (see Rey and Stiglitz, 1995).
18It is straightforward to verify that these conditions are also suﬃcient for an optimum with linear demands.
11Since prices are strategic complements, the strategic eﬀect of an increase in wi on Mi’s proﬁts is
positive.




β(4β2 − γ2 − 2βγ)
, (4)
which yields the manufacturer’s proﬁt
ΠN
ET =
2α2β(β − γ)(2β2 − γ2)
(β + γ)(4β2 − γ2 − 2βγ)2. (5)
When the degree of diﬀerentiation between the two brands is minimal, i.e., γ = β, both manu-
facturers price at marginal costs (wN
ET = 0) and make zero proﬁts.
Consider now collusion. Recall that retailers always set prices according to (1) for given





Di (pi (wi,wj),pj (wj,wi))pi (wi,wj).





















= 0, i = 1,2.






When the degree of diﬀerentiation between the two brands is maximal, i.e., γ = 0, the collusive
wholesale price is equal to zero: each manufacturer behaves as a monopolist and extracts the
whole downstream surplus by way of the ﬁxed fee. If instead γ > 0, to induce retailers to set the
monopoly price, manufacturers optimally set their wholesale prices above marginal costs due to
the strategic eﬀect. Since manufacturers are symmetric, in collusion each receives an equal share






Finally, consider deviation. Suppose that Mi is the deviant manufacturer, i.e., he oﬀers a
wholesale price diﬀerent than wC
ET, while Mj sticks to wC


































pi (.) = 0,
where the arguments of Di (.), pi (.) and pj (.) are the same as in (7). Because contracts are
observable before the retail competition stage, Mi anticipates that the retailers distributing the
competing brand will react immediately to his deviation, i.e., when observing an unexpected
wholesale price wi < wC






With linear demands, this leads to a deviation wholesale price of
wD
ET =
αγ2(4β2 − 2βγ − γ2)
8β2(2β2 − γ2)
.
It is straightforward to show that wD
ET falls short of the collusive wholesale price, i.e., wD
ET < wC
ET.
This is because the deviant manufacturer gains from undercutting his competitor to maximize his
sales proﬁt. In addition, the deviant’s wholesale price exceeds the static Nash price level, wD
ET >
wN
ET. This is the case because the wholesale price in collusion is larger than the equilibrium
wholesale price of the static game, and wholesale prices are strategic complements. The deviant
manufacturer gets the proﬁt
ΠD
ET =
α2(4β2 − 2βγ − γ2)2
32β(β + γ)(β − γ)(2β2 − γ2)
. (8)
Equipped with this characterization, we can now determine the critical discount factor δET
above which manufacturers can sustain collusion with exclusive territories. The condition that
identiﬁes this discount factor is standard: the stream of proﬁts earned by a manufacturer in










The value of δ which solves this self-enforceability constraint as an equality identiﬁes the lowest
critical discount factor above which manufacturers can collude with exclusive territories. Using
(5), (6) and (8) we obtain
δET =
(4β2 − 2βγ − γ2)2
(32β3 − 12γ2β)(β − γ) + γ4. (9)
It is easy to show that this discount factor is increasing in γ, i.e., collusion becomes more dif-
ﬁcult to sustain when competition gets more intense (products are closer substitutes). Moreover,
δET is also decreasing in β, i.e., demands that are less sensible to own price variations facilitate
cooperation.
13Non-exclusive Territories
Suppose now that both manufacturers distribute by way of non-exclusive territories, i.e.,
both allow for intrabrand competition. In this case, retailers distributing the same brand are in
Bertrand competition. Retail prices are equal to wholesale prices, i.e., pi = wi for i = 1,2, and
retailers make zero proﬁts irrespective of the contract oﬀered by the rival manufacturer. As a
consequence, franchise fees must be zero at equilibrium and manufacturers can make proﬁts only
by increasing wholesale prices above their marginal costs which are assumed to be zero.
As before, we ﬁrst look at the stage game that determines manufacturers’ proﬁts along the
punishment phase. Mi’s objective function is
Πi (wi,wj) = Di (wi,wj)wi, i = 1,2. (10)
Optimizing with respect to wi we get
∂Di (wi,wj)
∂wi
wi + Di (wi,wj) = 0, i = 1,2. (11)
Note that, in contrast to the case where both manufacturers impose exclusive territories,
with intrabrand competition there is no strategic eﬀect. Essentially, allowing for intrabrand
competition precludes retailers from adjusting their ﬁnal prices to the competitors’ marginal






As before, when brands’ diﬀerentiation is minimal (γ = β) manufacturers price at marginal costs.
Inserting the equilibrium wholesale price wN





(β + γ)(2β − γ)2, (12)
where, of course, ΠN
NE = 0 for γ = β.
Consider now collusion. It is straightforward to show that the collusive wholesale price is
now wC






Note that collusive proﬁts are the same with exclusive and non-exclusive territories, although
wholesale prices diﬀer between the two regimes. This is because, when both manufacturers allow
for intrabrand competition, they choose the retail price directly. Diﬀerently, when both impose
exclusive territories, the wholesale prices are set in such a way to induce retailers to charge
the same equilibrium retail price as with non-exclusive territories. Hence, the total ‘pie’ that
14manufacturers split does not change.
Turning to the deviation proﬁts, the same logic developed above allows us to calculate the de-





















16β(β − γ)(β + γ)
. (13)














8β(β − γ) + γ2.
As before, also this critical value increases when competition becomes more intense, as re-
ﬂected by a larger γ, and decreases when demand becomes less sensible to own prices, as implied
by a larger β.
Asymmetric Distribution Channels
Suppose now that manufacturers have diﬀerent distribution modes, e.g., Mi imposes exclusive
territories while Mj allows for intrabrand competition. In this case, the retailers dealing with
Mj set retail prices equal to marginal costs as they face intrabrand competition, i.e., pj = wj.
Diﬀerently, those distributing brand i face only interbrand competition and adjust their ﬁnal
prices to the rivals’ marginal costs. With linear demands, it is immediate to check that this
yields a best reply function of
pi (wi,wj) =
α(β − γ) + βwi + γwj
2β
.
A simple backward induction argument allows to show that the manufacturer imposing ex-
clusive territories sets a wholesale price equal to his marginal costs (wi = 0), so as to maximize
his retailers’ proﬁts, and then fully extract this surplus through the ﬁxed fee Ti. Diﬀerently, the
manufacturer distributing via non-exclusive territories must charge a wholesale price above his
15marginal costs to make proﬁts. His optimal wholesale price is given by
wj =
α(2β2 − βγ − γ2)
2(2β2 − γ2)
.
Upstream proﬁts are then
Πi = ΠN
ET,NE =
α2(2β + γ)2(β − γ)




α2(β − γ)(4β2 − 2βγ − γ2)2




NE,ET = 0 for γ = β.
Next, consider collusion. Since the distribution networks are asymmetric, we assume that
manufacturers share the ‘collusive pie’ so as to minimize the incentives to deviate. Let x be
Mi’s share of the manufacturers’ joint proﬁts. It is straightforward to verify that the collusive
wholesale prices are wC
i = αγ/(2β) and wC













Finally, consider deviation. Following the logic developed above, the deviation wholesale
prices are given by
wi = wD
ET,NE = 0 and wj = wD
NE,ET =
α(4β2 − 2βγ − γ2)
4(2β2 − γ2)
,

















α2(4β2 − 2βγ − γ2)2
32β(β − γ)(β + γ)(2β2 − γ2)
.
In the asymmetric case under consideration there are two diﬀerent self-enforceability con-
straints, one for each manufacturer depending on the share x. This asymmetry leads to two
critical discount factors, that can be determined with the standard procedure described above.
Since manufacturers share the collusive pie potentially unevenly, these discount factors will be
functions of the sharing rule x. Formally,
















Since our objective is to determine the largest range of discount factors compatible with














The unique solution of this program is obtained by equalizing δi (x) and δj (x), which gives us
δAS =
(2β2 − γ2)(8β2 − 4βγ − γ2)
32β4 − 16β3γ − 24β2γ2 + 8γ3β + 3γ4.
For every discount factor above this threshold, collusion is viable with asymmetric distribution
networks.
4.1 The Collusive Eﬀect of Exclusive Territories
We can now provide the ﬁrst result of the paper by ranking the critical discount factors obtained
above.
Proposition 1 Exclusive territories facilitate collusion if and only if both manufacturers dis-
tribute via this organizational mode—i.e., δET < δNE < δAS.
Distributing via exclusive territories has two opposing eﬀects on collusion. On the one hand,
the stage game proﬁt is larger when both manufacturers impose exclusive territories. This eﬀect
hinges on the genuine incentive of manufacturers to raise wholesale prices above marginal costs in
the stage game with exclusive territories. This strategic eﬀect was emphasized in the ﬁrst-order














The larger is this term, the less harsh is the punishment with exclusive territories.
On the other hand—since contracts are observable—when both manufacturers distribute via
exclusive territories, retailers can spot and react to a deviation in the very same time period
where such an unexpected oﬀer is made. When a manufacturer undercuts his rival by charging
a wholesale price that is lower than expected, the retailers distributing the rival’s brand reduce
their ﬁnal prices, thereby stiﬂing the deviation gain of the former manufacturer. The extent of














17Once again, the larger is this term, the smaller is the proﬁt that a manufacturer can earn by
undercutting his rival when both impose exclusive territories, and the latter charges the collusive
wholesale price wC
ET.
Which of these two countervailing forces dominates? In general, it is not clear whether (15)
is larger than (14). However, with linear demands—and more generally when the second order
derivatives of the demand function are small—it turns out that the latter eﬀect is invariably
stronger than the former. This is because, due to strategic complementarity, the deviation
wholesale price exceeds the Nash level, i.e., wD
ET > wN
ET. Since with linear demand the slope of
the demand function is constant, (15) is larger than (14).
An important prediction of our model is that exclusive territories facilitate collusion if and
only if both manufacturers distribute in this manner. As long as only one manufacturer, say Mi,
imposes exclusive territories, collusion is harder to sustain, i.e., δAS > δNE. This is because
intrabrand competition prevents the retailers dealing with Mj to react on Mi’s deviation. Hence,
since only the eﬀect of reduced punishment survives in this case, Mi’s incentive to undercut his
competitor is stronger than in the case where both manufacturers allow for intrabrand competi-
tion. This result diﬀers from the ones obtained in the vertical restraints literature. For instance,
in Nocke and White (2007) a single vertical merger suﬃces to facilitate collusion because its main
pro-collusive force is to reduce the deviation proﬁts of non-integrated ﬁrms. However, as Nocke
and White (2007) show, multiple mergers do not necessarily do so.
4.2 Endogenous Distribution Modes
So far we have treated each manufacturer’s distribution mode as an exogenous feature of the en-
vironment. In this subsection we extend the analysis by allowing each manufacturer to make this
choice. Suppose that, at the outset of the game, manufacturers simultaneously and independently
choose their distribution channels. And, for the sake of crispiness, assume for the moment that
these decisions are made once and for all. This feature reﬂects the idea that distribution systems
are not easy to change in practice. For example, Azoulay and Shane (2001) note that in the
franchising industry transaction costs of changing the contracts are very large due to mandatory
registration and material change laws.
Denote by G the extended game with the commitment stage. The next proposition shows
that manufacturers indeed choose exclusive territories to sustain collusion whenever possible.
Proposition 2 With public contracts, game G has the following properties:
• For δ < δET, there exists a unique equilibrium where both manufacturers impose exclusive
territories but do not collude.
• For δET ≤ δ < δNE, there exists a unique equilibrium where both manufacturers impose
exclusive territories and collude.
18• For δNE ≤ δ < δAS, there are two payoﬀ-equivalent symmetric equilibria, one where both
manufacturers impose exclusive territories, and another where they both allow for intra-
brand competition. In each equilibrium collusion is sustained.
• For δ ≥ δAS, there exists a unique equilibrium where both manufacturers impose exclusive
territories and collude.
It should be noted that for δ ≥ δAS there is a unique equilibrium where both manufacturers
impose exclusive territories and collude even if, in this region of parameters, cooperation would
be viable with one or both manufacturers allowing for intrabrand competition. This is the case
because, when one manufacturer imposes exclusive territories but the other does not, the former
receives a larger fraction of the collusive proﬁt since he has a larger incentive to deviate. Hence,
for each manufacturer it is strictly dominant to impose exclusive territories. This result is in
line with Nocke and White (2007) who note that the distribution of the collusive proﬁt is often
asymmetric if upstream ﬁrms are asymmetric as well.
As a consequence, a distinctive feature of our model, which we show by going through the
entire normal form of the game, is that in equilibrium indeed both manufacturers choose to
distribute via exclusive territories for collusive purposes. This prediction appears to ﬁt with the
empirical evidence provided by Kalnins (2004) who ﬁnds that in 1998 in Texas several hotel
chains began to grant territorial exclusivity to its franchisees at the same time.
5 Other Vertical Restraints
The analysis pursued so far has revealed that exclusive territories facilitate collusion relative
to arrangements allowing for intrabrand competition since the former give retailers freedom in
their pricing decisions, thereby allowing them to react instantaneously on a deviation of the rival
manufacturer. As pointed out by Nocke and White (2007) this eﬀect is also present in a model of
vertical integration—i.e., the integrated ﬁrm can react via its downstream unit on a deviation by
non-integrated upstream ﬁrms, which renders deviation for those ﬁrms less proﬁtable. Therefore,
an important question is whether in our supply chains set-up manufacturers can use other forms
of vertical restraints than exclusive territories to lower the critical discount factor above which
collusion is viable. To tackle this issue we consider two prominent examples: vertical integration
and resale price maintenance (RPM). As mentioned above, previous papers showed that these
restraints can facilitate collusion in diﬀerent set-ups (see Nocke and White, 2007, and Normann,
2009, for vertical integration, and Jullien and Rey, 2008, for RPM). In this section we show that
both these vertical restraints have no bite in terms of facilitating collusion in our supply chains
framework. To make our point as clear and concise as possible, we focus on the symmetric case
in which both manufacturers are either vertically integrated or impose RPM.
Vertical integration. Suppose that manufacturers do not distribute via independent retailers
but are instead integrated with their retailers in a given territory. In this case, manufacturers
19compete with each other at the ﬁnal consumer market. As above, let us ﬁrst look at the Nash
proﬁts. The proﬁt of a manufacturer can be written as
Πi(pi,pj) = Di(pi,pj)pi, i = 1,2,
leading to a ﬁrst-order condition of
∂Di(pi,pj)
∂pi
pi + Di(pi,pj) = 0, i = 1,2.
This condition is the same as (11) obtained in the case of non-exclusive territories, since retailers
set pi = wi in the latter case. Thus, the punishment proﬁt is the same under vertical integration
and under non-exclusive territories.
Similarly, since manufacturers set the downstream price directly when being vertically inte-
grated, the downstream prices in collusion with vertical integration, pC
V I, are the same as those
found with non-exclusive territories—i.e., pC
V I = wC
NE. Thus, the collusion proﬁt is also the same.










V I) = 0.
Since pC
V I = wC
NE, the deviant manufacturer sets the same downstream price as in case of non-
exclusive territories, and so the deviation proﬁt is also the same. Therefore, the critical discount
factor above which collusion can be sustained if both manufacturers are vertically integrated is
the same as the one under non-exclusive territories. As a consequence, vertical integration does
not facilitate collusion over and above intrabrand competition. But this implies that, in the
context of our model, exclusive territories dominate vertical integration for collusive purposes.
Resale price maintenance. When manufacturers impose RPM, retailers do not make any pricing
decision but just decide whether to accept or reject their received oﬀers. Indeed, under RPM,
contracts specify downstream prices as well, that is Ci = (wi,pi,Fi). This implies that the Nash
proﬁt of a manufacturer can again be written as
Πi (pi,pj) = Di(pi,pj)pi, i = 1,2,
which leads to the same ﬁrst-order condition as (11). Thus, the punishment proﬁt with RPM is
the same as the one with non-exclusive territories. By the same logic as in the analysis of vertical
integration, it is also easy to show that the collusive and the deviation proﬁts do not change with
RPM relative to non-exclusive territories. Hence, also RPM does not facilitate collusion.
20Taking these insights together, we can summarize the analysis in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 If both manufacturers are vertically integrated, or they both impose RPM, the
critical discount factor above which collusion is viable is equal to δNE, which is the level found in
the case of non-exclusive territories. Hence, exclusive territories are the distribution mode that
maximizes the range of discount factors compatible with collusion.
So, in our supply chains framework, neither vertical integration nor RPM facilitate collusion
relative to intrabrand competition. The intuition is as follows: Under vertical integration the
retail unit of a supply chain belongs to the manufacturer. Therefore, manufacturers compete
directly in the retail market, which implies that a cheating manufacturer deviates by lowering
the ﬁnal consumer price. But this means that the rival manufacturer cannot react on this
deviation in the very same period. Hence, the deviation proﬁt cannot be diminished compared
to the case of non-exclusive territories. In addition, since there is only one layer of competition,
there is no strategic eﬀect whatsoever, implying that also the punishment proﬁt is the same with
vertical integration and with non-exclusive territories.19
In contrast to vertical integration, RPM eliminates competition not at the wholesale but at
the retail level. However, the consequence is that again an instantaneous reaction on a deviation
is not feasible which implies that vertical price ﬁxing cannot help making collusion easier to
sustain relative to non-exclusive territories. It is important to note that both these results hold
for general demand functions.
In summary, neither vertical integration nor resale price maintenance have bite in our supply
chains model. This is because under these forms of vertical restraints there is no instantaneous
reaction eﬀect while exclusive territories bring about this pro-collusive force. This result can
be contrasted with the one obtained in Nocke and White (2007) and Normann (2009). They
show that vertical integration facilitates collusion in a setting in which upstream ﬁrms are in
perfect competition to each other and compete to sell to all downstream ﬁrms. By contrast,
we demonstrate that in a framework of supply chain competition manufacturers prefer exclusive
territories over vertical integration to sustain collusion. As for RPM, while Jullien and Rey (2007)
showed that vertical price control facilitates collusion between supply chains under uncertain ﬁnal
demands due to the detection eﬀect, we argue that without uncertainty exclusive territories are
a better collusive tool relative to RPM.
6 Extensions of the Baseline Model
Up until now, the baseline model has been developed under the hypotheses that: (i) contracts are
observable, (ii) manufacturers are committed to the distribution mode, and that (iii) intrabrand
competition is perfect. In this section we extend the model so as to allow for these possibilities.
19The absence of the strategic eﬀect was also demonstrated by Bonanno and Vickers (1998) in a static model.
They show that due to this eﬀect ﬁrms have an incentive to stay unintegrated.
21The objective is to show that the main insights do not change, ﬁrst, when manufacturers vol-
untarily decide whether to share information about wholesale contracts, and, second, when, in
addition, they can change the distribution mode every period. Moreover, we also demonstrate
that our results are reinforced when intrabrand competition is not perfect.
6.1 Private Contracts
We ﬁrst study the case of private contracts, i.e., each manufacturer’s oﬀer cannot be observed
by the retailers distributing the competing brand before the retail competition stage. This
assumption captures the idea that in some instances manufacturers lack commitment power
because they can recontract and/or oﬀer secret discounts. In line with the earlier literature—
e.g., Hart and Tirole (1990), Katz (1991), McAfee and Schwartz (1994) and White (2007)—we
assume that the equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) with the added
passive beliefs reﬁnement: when a retailer is oﬀered a contract diﬀerent than the one he expects
in a candidate equilibrium, he does not revise its beliefs about the contract oﬀered to the rival
retailers. It should be noted that, although contracts are not observable, a manufacturer can
infer if his rival deviated from collusion because he observes the input order of his retailers
in each period. If this order is an out-of-equilibrium one, the manufacturer will play inﬁnite
Nash-reversion from the next period onwards.
The next proposition shows that in this case a neutrality result obtains:
Proposition 4 With private contracts, the critical discount factor above which collusion can be
sustained is independent of the distribution modes chosen by manufacturers and is equal to δNE.
The intuition is as follows. Since the retailers’ choice of downstream prices is unaﬀected by
unobserved changes in the input prices to rival retailers, each manufacturer acts as if he was
integrated with his retailers and faces a given residual downstream demand. Proﬁt maximization
then involves setting the input price equal to the manufacturers’ marginal cost.20 Hence, private
contracting intensiﬁes upstream competition relative to the case of contract observability. Es-
sentially, although the distribution choice is public, with secret contracts, manufacturers cannot
credibly inﬂuence the behavior of rival retailers. Interestingly, this neutrality result holds for
general demand functions—see the Appendix.
6.2 Endogenous Disclosure
In this subsection we consider the case where the management of a supply chain decides whether
to make wholesale contracts observable to third parties, e.g., by joining a trade association—see
Briley et al. (1994). To account for this possibility, we extend the baseline model by allow-
ing manufacturers to choose at each stage of the game between making contracts observable or
20As observed by McAfee and Schwartz (1994), this result is quite general: it does not hinge on the nature of
downstream production (ﬁxed versus variable proportions) or of downstream competition (strategic substitutes or
strategic complements).
22keeping them secret. For obvious reasons, we assume that when manufacturers decide to commu-
nicate, it must be feasible for them to credibly disclose their contracts to rivals—i.e., if disclosed,
contracts are hard information.21 This assumption has been made in the information sharing
literature22 and it seems reasonable in all circumstances where, to be legally binding, contracts
need to be recorded in a ‘Public Registry’ or require veriﬁable legal certiﬁcations. The following
result then obtains:
Proposition 5 With endogenous disclosure, manufacturers always make their contracts observ-
able to third parties in equilibrium and the critical discount factors are the same as those char-
acterized in Proposition 1. Hence, exclusive territories facilitate collusion.
An interesting feature of this result is that a manufacturer who imposes exclusive territories
always gains by making his contract public. This is because with exclusive territories disclosing
the wholesale price generates the strategic eﬀect which is beneﬁcial to manufacturers. Diﬀerently,
when a manufacturer allows for intrabrand competition, he is indiﬀerent between making his oﬀer
public or keeping it secret. This is because intrabrand competition forces retailers of the same
brand to price at wholesale prices. Summing up, if manufacturers have the choice between
information sharing or not, they decide to make the contract public under exclusive territories
to be able to sustain cooperative outcomes for a larger range of parameters.
6.3 Lack of Commitment
So far, we assumed that the distribution mode of each supply chain is chosen once and for all
at the outset of the game. This hypothesis seems natural when the transaction costs associated
with changes in the form of distribution networks are very large. However, when such costs are
relatively small, the distribution channel of each manufacturer is endogenous and results as the
equilibrium outcome of a game where upstream ﬁrms decide their organizational strategies along
with their wholesale contracts at each stage of the game. To account for this possibility we now
extend the game by allowing manufacturers to decide about their distribution modes period after
period.
Manufacturers’ actions have three components at each stage, i.e., (i) a distribution mode
(exclusive vs non-exclusive territories), (ii) a disclosure decision (public vs private contracting),
and (iii) a wholesale contract. We obtain the following result:
Proposition 6 If manufacturers can change their mode of distribution in every period, manu-
facturers collude via exclusive territories, and the range of discount factors for which collusion
is viable is larger than in case of commitment to the distribution mode.
21Hard information is quantitative, easy to store and transmit in impersonal ways, and its content is independent
of the collection process. In this sense, a legal contract indicating the wholesale price and franchise fee can be
interpreted as hard information.
22See, e.g., Gal-Or (1985) and Raith (1996) for information sharing in oligopoly or Jappelli and Pagano (1993)
for a model of information sharing in the banking literature.
23The intuition is as follows. By imposing exclusive territories a manufacturer enables his
retailers to react to an unexpected oﬀer by the rival manufacturer in the period where such an
oﬀer is observed. Hence, with exclusive territories, the deviation proﬁt is the lowest among all
distribution modes. Thus, manufacturers choose to sustain tacit collusion via exclusive territories.
In addition, with lack of commitment, the stage game has two symmetric equilibria. The
ﬁrst type of equilibrium is such that both manufacturers choose exclusive territories and make
their contracts observable to third parties. The second type of equilibrium is such that both
manufacturers choose non-exclusive territories and either disclose or not disclose their contracts.
Clearly, in the latter type of equilibrium manufacturers obtain lower proﬁts than in the former.
However, the latter combination is an equilibrium, since, given that Mj chooses non-exclusive
territories, the proﬁt of Mi is the same independent of his regime choice. This is because, due
to intrabrand competition, retailers dealing with Mj have no discretion in setting prices and
always set pj = wj. Thus, Mi is indiﬀerent between the distribution regimes and ﬁnds it optimal
to distribute via non-exclusive territories, thereby rendering the choice of Mj to also distribute
via non-exclusive-territories optimal. The implication for the inﬁnitely repeated game is then
that the critical discount factor is minimized if this equilibrium is played as a punishment in the
periods after a deviation.
As a consequence, we obtain that exclusive territories facilitate collusion in the extreme cases
when manufacturers are committed to the organizational mode and when they can change it at
no costs. But this implies that even in less extreme cases, i.e., when changing the organizational
mode involves ﬁnite costs or can only be changed every t > 1 periods, the result applies as well.
6.4 Imperfect Intrabrand Competition
In this section we show that the qualitative insights of the baseline model survive, and are even
strengthened, in the case of imperfect intrabrand competition. To this purpose, we consider the
simplest case in which each manufacturer can either allow for intrabrand competition between
two retailers selling diﬀerentiated products or grant territorial exclusivity to only one of them.
So while under exclusivity a manufacturer is selling only one product, under non-exclusivity
he sells two diﬀerent products via his retailers. Hence, ceteris paribus, the total demand of a
manufacturer’s good expands under non-exclusive territories relative to the exclusivity regime.23
Naturally, the products of the two retailers distributing the same brand are less diﬀerentiated
than the products of the competing brand. This can expressed in the following way. If both
manufacturers distribute by way of non-exclusive territories, the inverse demand function of
retailer 1 distributing manufacturer i’s product is
Di1(qi1,qi2,qj1,qj2) = α − βqi1 − σβqi2 − γ(qj1 + qj2),
23For example, this is meant to capture a situation in which retailers of the same brand are located at diﬀerent
geographical points in the market. To see this, consider the market for soft drinks or hotels. In the ﬁrst case a soft
drink producer sells more bottles via two retailers located at diﬀerent points of a street than with only one, while
in the second case a hotel franchisor gets more customers with two hotels in a neighborhood than with only one.
24with σ ∈ [γ/β,1]. Here qi1 and qi2 are the quantities of the two retailers of manufacturer i, while
qj1 and qj2 are those of the retailers of manufacturer j. The parameter σ measures the degree
of diﬀerentiation between two retailers distributing the same brand. If σ = 1, we are back to
the previous analysis with perfect intrabrand competition. Assuming σ ≥ γ/β ensures that the
products of retailers of the same brands are closer substitutes than those of competing brands.
Again we will look for the distribution mode that allows manufacturers to sustain collusion for
the largest range of discount factors.
There is one main diﬀerence between this framework and the one analyzed above. Of course,
under exclusive territories nothing changes because each brand is sold by only one retailer. How-
ever, with imperfect intrabrand competition, the proﬁts of manufacturers in collusion, deviation
and punishment under non-exclusive territories scale up relative to the case of perfect competi-
tion between retailers of the same brand. This is because allowing for intrabrand competition
now has a demand enhancing eﬀect. Hence, while the critical discount factor does not change
with exclusive territories and is still equal to δET , the one with non-exclusive territories, denote
it by ˆ δNE, is diﬀerent to the one obtained under perfect intrabrand competition. In principle,
the eﬀect of this diﬀerence on collusion is not obvious. However, the next proposition shows that
in the linear set-up at hand the result is clear-cut.
Proposition 7 Exclusive territories facilitate collusion even with imperfect intrabrand competi-
tion, i.e., δET < ˆ δNE. Moreover, the pro-collusive eﬀect of exclusive territories becomes larger
the less intense intrabrand competition is, i.e., the diﬀerence ˆ δNE − δET expands as σ becomes
smaller.24
The economic intuition for why the pro-collusive eﬀect of exclusive territories becomes larger
when intrabrand competition becomes less intense hinges on the eﬀect that a change in σ has on
ˆ δNE and is as follows. Collusion, deviation and punishment proﬁts are higher for lower values
of σ. However, the gain from deviation is particularly large because a deviating manufacturer
can now gain on two products. As a consequence, the sum of the increase in the deviation and
punishment proﬁt overturns the increase in the collusive proﬁt in our linear framework.
This also explains why exclusive territories facilitate collusion even with imperfect intrabrand
competition. In addition to the instantaneous reaction eﬀect described above, distributing via
exclusive territories now also reduces the temptation of a manufacturer to deviate simply because
by cutting its wholesale price he can gain via larger sales of only one retailer and not of both as
under intrabrand competition. In summary, exclusive territories provide a commitment device
for manufacturers to keep the deviation proﬁt low enough to render collusion sustainable.
Finally, it should be noted that with imperfect intrabrand competition collusive proﬁts under
non-exclusive territories are higher than under exclusivity. Hence, the comparison of discount
factors performed above is not made for equal proﬁts. For simplicity, we do not address the
24For the sake of simplicity we do not consider the case of asymmetric distribution regimes. However, it is possible
to show that δET is also smaller than the discount factor obtained with an asymmetric distribution regime.
25issue of endogenous distribution modes here—an analysis that would be cumbersome due to the
multiplicity of cases to analyze (see Normann, 2009, for a similar approach). In summary, the
prediction of our result is that there exists a range of discount factor in which manufacturers
imposing exclusive territories are in collusion, while those who allow for intrabrand competition
are not.
7 Service Incentives
So far we neglected investment problems on the retailers’ side. However, the provision of the right
incentives to invest into promotional services or spend advertising eﬀort is an important issue
in several markets. In the existing literature the standard explanation for territorial exclusivity
is indeed to avoid the well-known free-riding problem between retailers whose investment into
services would be eroded under intrabrand competition. The goal of this section is to analyze the
interplay between these incentives and the economic forces highlighted in the previous analysis.
To the best of our knowledge, this analysis is the ﬁrst to combine both upstream competition
and downstream service investment in a model of exclusive territories.
We incorporate service provision by retailers in a natural way. In the last stage of our
game retailers now not only set ﬁnal prices but also provide costly demand enhancing eﬀort. In
particular, denote the sum of eﬀorts of manufacturer i’s retailers by ei. Then, the inverse demand
function can be written as Pi(qi,qj,ei) = α + ei − βqi − γqj, i,j = 1,2, i 6= j. Inverting this
system one obtains the following direct demand functions
Di(qi,qj,ei,ej) =
α(β − γ) + βei − γej − βpi + γpj
β2 − γ2 for i = 1,2.
Eﬀort costs of a retailer ` dealing with manufacturer i who sets an eﬀort level of e`i are C(e`i) =
(k/2)e2
`i. Such a quadratic cost function is common in previous research (see, e.g., Mussa and
Rosen, 1978, or Iyer, 1998). Nevertheless, the insights of the analysis are valid for any increasing
and strictly convex cost function. Here, k measures how costly it is to provide eﬀort relative
to the demand expansion, and it can be interpreted as the importance of service provision. For
example, if k → ∞, eﬀort provision plays no role, which implies that ei = 0. In this case we
are back in our baseline model. Thus, this new analysis includes our baseline model as a special
case.
Finally, to guarantee interior solutions, we impose that the cost function is convex enough so
that a ﬁnite level of eﬀort is optimal for retailers:
k ≥




≡ ¯ k > 0. (16)
This guarantees that second-order conditions of the retailers’ and manufacturers’ maximization
problems are satisﬁed.
26Two main eﬀects will drive our results. One eﬀect is straightforward and it implies that
collusive proﬁts are higher with exclusive territories simply because in this regime retailers pro-
vide positive eﬀort. This clearly goes in the direction of making collusion easier to sustain when
preventing intrabrand competition. On the other hand, in this enriched framework the instanta-
neous reaction eﬀect becomes more complex since retailers not only change their pricing decisions
as a response to a deviation, but they also change their eﬀort levels. In particular, following a
price cut the retailer of a deviant manufacturer increases its eﬀort, thereby raising the gain from
deviation under exclusive territories. The following result shows that the parameter k shapes the
trade-oﬀ between these eﬀects:
Proposition 8 There exists a threshold k1 > ¯ k, such that:
• For k > k1, collusion is easiest to sustain if both manufacturers distribute by way of exclu-
sive territories, that is, δET is smaller than δNE and δAS.
• For k < k1, collusion is easiest to sustain if both manufacturers distribute by way of non-
exclusive territories, that is, δNE is smaller than δET and δAS.
The result shows that if service problems are important enough, i.e., k < k1, collusion is easier
to sustain if manufacturers allow for intrabrand competition. The reason is that, with exclusive
territories, a deviation of one manufacturer makes it more proﬁtable for his retailers to invest into
services. This is the case because the retailers face a lower wholesale price and, therefore, beneﬁt
to a larger extent from an enhanced demand. But, since eﬀort levels of competing retailers
are strategic substitutes, the retailer of the non-deviating manufacturer optimally reduces its
eﬀort level. As a consequence, a deviation becomes very proﬁtable if investment in services is
important enough. By contrast, if manufacturers distribute through non-exclusive territories,
retailers spend no eﬀort because of the free-riding problem. Thus, the critical discount factor
remains unchanged. So we ﬁnd that if eﬀort provision by retailers is very important, the eﬀect
that retailers of a deviating manufacturer provide higher eﬀort dominates, whereby making non-
exclusive territories a more suitable mode for collusion purposes.
In summary, combining the analysis of manufacturer competition with retailers’ service in-
vestments allows us to identify a novel eﬀect that has not been identiﬁed in the literature so far:
retailers of a deviating manufacturer have stronger incentives to provide demand enhancing ser-
vices, thereby making deviation more proﬁtable. In this respect, our analysis demonstrates that,
while in a static context exclusive territories raise manufacturers’ proﬁts both via the strategic
eﬀect and the removal of the free-riding problem, in a dynamic game the interplay between these
two eﬀects generates a novel force that favors non-exclusive territories.
278 Conclusion
We analyzed the use of exclusive territories in a model of repeated interaction between compet-
ing manufacturers. Our results show that there is a genuine tension between static and dynamic
incentives that shapes manufacturers’ scope for limiting intrabrand competition. While in the
static analysis manufacturers unambiguously beneﬁt from exclusive territories, because this al-
lows retailers to price above marginal costs, in a repeated framework this eﬀect makes collusion
more diﬃcult to sustain as it increases proﬁts in the punishment phase. Nevertheless, with re-
peated interaction, a countervailing eﬀect through deviation proﬁts comes into play that tends
to make cooperative outcomes easier to sustain with exclusive territories. When both manufac-
turers prevent intrabrand competition, retailers adapt their pricing decisions to the wholesale
contract oﬀered by the competing manufacturer. This ‘instantaneous reaction’ mechanism fa-
cilitates collusion with exclusive territories because it stiﬂes manufacturers’ (spot) gains from
deviation. With linear demands, it turns out that the latter eﬀect completely oﬀsets the former,
whereby making exclusive territories the more suitable organizational mode to sustain cooper-
ative outcomes. This result is robust to extensions concerning the disclosure and commitment
rules. Moreover, it gets strengthened with imperfect intrabrand competition since manufacturers
can commit to sell only through one retailer, and this attenuates their gains from deviation.
Finally, we extend the our analysis to allow for retailers’ investments into demand enhancing
services. Here we show that a new eﬀect emerges under exclusive territories which is that the
retailers of a deviating manufacturer have higher investment incentives. As a result, we obtain
that if service investments are important enough, this new eﬀect can dominate the instantaneous
reaction eﬀect. Interestingly, this latter analysis shows that while manufacturer competition and
retailer investments favor the use of exclusive territories in a static context, they bring about a
novel force in a dynamic context that favors the use of intrabrand competition.
The paper provides novel implications on the beneﬁts of vertical restraints in supply chains:
First, the pro-collusive eﬀect of exclusive territories emerges only if all manufacturers distribute
via this mode. Second, vertical integration as well as vertical price control do not facilitate
collusion over and above intrabrand competition. Finally, the pro-collusive eﬀect of exclusive
territories can be undermined in a model where retailers also invest into demand enhancing
services if the provision of these services is important enough.
Our results have implications both for supply chain managers and for policy makers. For
supply chain managers one of our most interesting results is that exclusive territories make it
easier to sustain cooperative outcomes in competition between rival supply chains. This result
applies since retailers have discretion over their ﬁnal good prices, which gives them the power to
react instantaneously to deviations by competing supply chains. Moreover, it is important for
supply chain managers to note that other instruments like vertical integration or vertical price
controls cannot achieve this goal and therefore have no bite in facilitating collusion. In addition,
we show that the pro-collusive eﬀect works only if rival supply chains also compete by way of
28exclusive territories. Therefore, the implication for a supply chain manager is that it can be
proﬁtable to change the distribution system to exclusive territories if rival chains have done so
as well to sustain cooperation, a result in line with the evidence found in Kalnins (2004).
It is also of importance for the manager of a supply chain to understand that the above
mentioned instantaneous reaction eﬀect only works if there is some form of information sharing
agreement with rivals. However, pure information sharing alone is not beneﬁcial to supply chains
if they do not give retailers the freedom to select the downstream prices. Only contract disclosure
coupled with territorial exclusivity helps to sustain cooperative outcomes between supply chains.
Finally, supply chain managers must be aware of the eﬀect that service provision by retailers
may undermines this pro-collusive force of exclusive territories. This is the case because retailers
of a deviating manufacturer increase their service investments due to the lower wholesale price
thereby rendering a deviation more proﬁtable. Thus, although exclusive territories lead to a larger
investment level than intrabrand competition, they may hinder collusion if service provision is
important enough.
Our results are also of interest from an antitrust perspective. As argued in the introduction,
dynamic considerations are very likely to be of strong relevance in several industries in which man-
ufacturers engage in exclusive territories. Therefore, it is of importance for antitrust authorities
if exclusive territories are pro- or anticompetitive. In particular, this is the case since exclusive
territories are treated diﬀerently in the U.S. and in Europe, and also the treatment in the U.S.
had undergone several changes. For example, in the 1970’s exclusive territories were illegal per
se in the U.S. but in 1977 the Supreme Court overruled this decision and they are currently
viewed under a rule-of-reason principle.25 To the contrary the European commission consistently
opposed the praxis of exclusive territories. Our paper shows that due to the ’instantaneous re-
action’ mechanism exclusive territories may facilitate tacit collusion between manufacturers and
are therefore likely to be anticompetitive if manufacturers compete repeatedly. Our analysis also
shows that from a collusive point of view exclusive territories should be viewed more suspiciously
than other vertical restraints, like RPM, that are also illegal in many countries.26
An assumption we made throughout the analysis is that cheated upstream ﬁrms punish
deviations with inﬁnite Nash reversion. This begs the question if the pro-collusive eﬀect of
exclusive territories would still hold when optimal punishment is in place.27 One can easily argue
that this is the case in the context of our model, because were manufacturers able to punish
deviations according to an optimal penal code, the diﬀerence between the punishment proﬁts
25See Sass and Saurman (1993) for a history of the treatment of exclusive territories, and the current praxis in
diﬀerent states.
26For example, in Europe RPM is generally illegal. In the U.S. the Supreme Court has recently struck down a
law that would prohibit RPM completely and instead concluded that RPM should be judged on a case-by-case
basis.
27Characterizing optimal penal codes is somewhat tricky in models with diﬀerentiated products—see, e.g., Wern-
erfelt (1989) or H¨ ackner (1996)—because manufacturers receive positive proﬁts even in the punishment phase since
prices cannot be negative. Thus, determining the punishment proﬁt involves the calculation of the optimal pun-
ishment length which is usually not possible in closed form.
29with and without exclusive territories would shrink since optimal punishment involves returning
to collusion after some time. However, the instantaneous reaction of competing retailers after a
deviation is still possible only under exclusive territories. So this eﬀect becomes relatively stronger
under optimal penal codes, whereby unambiguously increasing the pro-collusive value of exclusive
territories.28 We also supposed that retailers are short-lived, i.e., they are basically passive in
the repeated interaction not only with their competitors but also vis-` a-vis manufacturers. This
assumption is standard and has been made in the earlier literature dealing with related issues
(see, e.g., Jullien and Rey, 2007, and Schinkel et al., 2008). In future research we hope to extend
our analysis of collusion between competing supply chains so as to relax this hypothesis.
28We thank Patrick Rey for pointing this out to us.
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Proof of Proposition 1. Using the expressions for the discount factors we have
δET − δNE = −
4β3γ4(β − γ)(4β − 3γ)
(8β(β − γ) + γ2)((32β − 12βγ2)(β − γ) + γ4)
,
and
δNE − δAS = −
2γ3(β − γ)(4β2 − βγ − γ2)
(8β(β − γ) + γ2)(32β4 − 16β3γ−24β2γ2 + 8βγ3 + 3γ4)
.
It is immediate to verify that δET < δNE < δAS. Hence, there is a range of δ in which collusion
can be sustained if both manufacturers impose exclusive territories, but not if one or both allow
for intrabrand competition. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider ﬁrst δ < δET. In this range collusion can never be sustained.
Hence, each manufacturer chooses the distribution mode that yields the largest stage game proﬁt




NE, it is a dominant
action for each manufacturer to impose exclusive territories.
Next, suppose that δ ∈ [δET,δNE). In this range collusion can be sustained only when both
manufacturers impose exclusive territories. No manufacturer wants to deviate from this strategy
because ΠC
ET > ΠN
NE,ET. Moreover, since ΠN
ET,NE > ΠN
NE, imposing exclusive territories is again
a dominant action for each manufacturer.
Suppose now that δ ∈ (δNE,δAS). We know that ΠC
ET > ΠN
NE,ET, hence there exists an equi-
librium where both manufacturers impose exclusive territories. But, since in this range collusion
can also be sustained if both manufacturers allow for intrabrand competition, and ΠC
NE > ΠN
ET,NE
there exists also an equilibrium where both manufacturers do not impose exclusive territories.
Finally, suppose that δ ≥ δAS. In this range any pair of organizational modes sustains
collusion. If both manufacturers choose the same distribution network, each one gets half of the
collusive proﬁt, while if Mi chooses exclusive territories and Mj chooses non-exclusive territories,
Mi receives a share x of the collusive proﬁt. Calculating x so as to minimize the discount factor
in the asymmetric case yields
x =
256β7 − 128β6γ − 320β5γ2 + 160β4γ3 + 104β3γ4 − 56β2γ5 − 3βγ6 + 3γ7
8β(2β2 − γ2)(32β4 − 16β3γ − 24β2γ2 + 8γ3β + 3γ4)
.





γ3(32β4 − 16β3γ − 24β2γ2 + 9γ3β + 3γ4)
8β(2β2 − γ2)(32β4 − 16β3γ − 24β2γ2 + 8γ3β + 3γ4)
> 0.





NE,ET. It then follows that for each manufacturer it is a dominant
strategy to impose exclusive territories. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof follows from the text. 
Proof of Proposition 4. We start with the Nash equilibrium of the stage game. In case both
manufacturers have non-exclusive territories, we have pi = wi because of intrabrand competition.
Therefore, the optimization problem of a manufacturer is the same irrespective of the contract




wi + Di (wi,wj) = 0, i = 1,2. (A1)
Suppose now that both manufacturers distribute via exclusive territories. Since contracts
are unobservable, here we need to specify oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs. Denote by ˜ pi
j the expectation
about brand j’s retail price of the retailers distributing brand i. We assumed passive beliefs;







, one has ˜ pi
j = pe
j and ˜ p
j
i = pe
i. This implies that for any pair (wi,wj) of wholesale





(pi − wi) + Di(pi,pe
j) = 0 i = 1,2. (A2)






i for i = 1,2 the solution to pi of the system of ﬁrst-order



















= 0, i = 1,2.
So, in a symmetric equilibrium where both manufacturers oﬀer the same wholesale contract
Ce = (Te,we), we must satisfy
∂Di(p(we),p(we))
∂pi
p(we) + Di(p(we),p(we)) = 0, i = 1,2. (A3)
It is immediate to verify by comparing equation (A1) with equation (A3), that, given the (sym-
metric) equilibrium wholesale price we, the equilibrium retail price pe ≡ p(we) is the same as
the one obtained in the case of non-exclusive territories. However, since wholesale prices in
both regimes satisfy the same downstream ﬁrst-order conditions, and manufacturers’ marginal
costs are zero in our model, with private contracts manufacturers set we = 0. This implies that
upstream proﬁts are the same in the two regimes where both manufacturers choose exclusive
territories and where they both allow for intrabrand competition.
Suppose now that one manufacturer imposes exclusive territories (Mi) while the other (Mj)
does not. It is straightforward to verify that the equilibrium ﬁrst-order condition for Mi is given
by (A3), while that of Mj is given by (A1). Therefore, the equilibrium outcome in such an
asymmetric case is again the same as in the two cases above: upstream proﬁts are also the same
irrespective of the distribution mode.
Next, consider collusion. With non-exclusive territories pi = wi for i = 1,2. Hence, wi is
chosen to maximize X
i=1,2
Πi(wi,wj) = Di(wi,wj)wi + Dj(wj,wi)wj,







wj = 0, i = 1,2. (A4)
With exclusive territories, instead, we have
X
i=1,2
Πi(wi,wj) = Di(pi(wi),pj(wj))pi(wi) + Dj(pj(wj),pi(wi))pj(wj),







pj(wj) = 0. (A5)
Using the same argument as above, one can show that condition (A5) implies the same retail
prices as in (A4), and that the same trivially holds for the case of asymmetric distribution
networks.
We can then turn to deviation. When both manufacturers allow for intrabrand competition,










= 0, i = 1,2,
where wC
NE is the collusive wholesale price that solves the system of equations (A4).
Next, suppose that both manufacturers distribute via exclusive territories. The optimal










= 0, i = 1,2,
where wC
ET is the solution to the system of equations (A5). From above we know that the collusive
retail prices are the same irrespective of manufacturers’ distribution modes—i.e., pj(wC
ET) =
wC
NE. This implies that the optimal deviation wholesale price is also the same irrespective of the
pair of distribution modes chosen by manufacturers at equilibrium. Hence, collusion, deviation
and punishment proﬁts are the same in all three regimes. This implies in turn that with private
contracts the critical discount factor above which upstream collusion is viable is unique and is
independent of the equilibrium distribution modes. Finally, since any equilibrium of the game
with private contracts yields the same wholesale prices, retail prices and upstream proﬁts as
those obtained with public contracts and non-exclusive territories, this discount factor must be
equal to δNE. 
Proof of Proposition 5. We start with the case in which both manufacturers distribute via
non-exclusive territories. We know already that in this case it is not important if the contract is
observable to rivals or not because due to intrabrand competition retailers set pi = wi anyway.
Thus, manufacturers are indiﬀerent between making their contracts observable or not. The
critical discount factor is the same as the one calculated in Section 4 and is given by
δNE =
(2β − γ)2
8β(β − γ) + γ2.
33Next, consider the case where both manufacturers impose exclusive territories. We ﬁrst look
at the stage game. Consider an equilibrium candidate where Mi charges a wholesale price we
i
and each brand i is sold at the retail price pe
i (for i = 1,2). The proﬁt function of a retailer
distributing brand i is then given by
α(β − γ) − βpi + γpe
j
β2 − γ2 (pi − wi).
Here, pe
j means that, in case Mj decides not to disclose his contract, retailers of the competing
brand conjecture that their rivals still charge the equilibrium price since they hold passive beliefs.
Maximizing the proﬁt function yields that the equilibrium in the game of retailers is given by
pi(wi,we
j) =
α(2β2 − γ2 − βγ) + β(2βwi + γwe
j)
4β2 − γ2 , i = 1,2. (A6)
Now we can turn to the ﬁrst stage which determines manufacturers’ wholesale contracts. In
principle, three outcomes can occur depending on each manufacturer’s decision to disclose his
contract or not: (i) either both manufacturers do not make their contracts observable, (ii) both
manufacturers make them observable, and (iii) one keeps its contract secret, while the other
makes it observable.





β(α(2β2 − γ2 − βγ) + βγ(we
j) − 2β2wi + γ2we
i)
(2β − γ)(2β + γ)(β + γ)(β − γ)
, i = 1,2. (A7)
As a consequence, the proﬁt of a retailer of manufacturer i is πi = qi(pi − wi), where pi and qi
are deﬁned in (A6) and (A7). Since manufacturer i can extract everything via the ﬁxed fee, he
maximizes Πi = piqi with respect to wi. Calculating equilibrium prices yields we





(2β − γ)2(β + γ)
.
We have to check whether manufacturer i can gain by making his contract observable whilst
manufacturer j keeps his contract secret. Calculating the optimal wi for this case yields
wi =
αγ2(2β2 − γ2 − βγ)
4β2(2β2 − γ2)
,




α2(β − γ)(2β + γ)
8β(β + γ)(2β2 − γ2)
.
It is readily checked that Π
ob,nob
ET > Πnob
ET. Therefore, the equilibrium of the stage game cannot
entail both manufacturers hiding their contracts.
By the same token, one can check that it in equilibrium it can never happen that manufac-
turers behave asymmetrically, i.e., Mi discloses his contract while Mj does not.
Finally consider the case where both manufacturers make the contract observable to the rival.
From Subsection 4.1 we know that proﬁts in this case are
Πob
ET =
2α2β(β − γ)(2β2 − γ2)
(β + γ)(4β2 − γ2 − 2βγ)2.




16α2β3(β − γ)(2β2 − γ2)
(β + γ)(2β + γ)2(2β − γ)2(4β2 − γ2 − 2βγ)2
which is lower than Πob
ET. Thus, the stage game proﬁt is given by Πob
ET.
Consider now the dynamic game. We begin with collusion. Maximizing manufacturers’
joint proﬁts yields wC = γα/2β irrespective of whether contracts are observable or not. Each






The observability regime is nevertheless important to determine the deviation proﬁt. In
equilibrium, manufacturers collude in such a way that deviation proﬁts are minimized in order
to achieve cooperative outcomes for the largest range of discount factors.
We know already that when both manufacturers collude via observable contracts, and one
of them deviates by keeping his contract public but changes the wholesale tariﬀ, the deviation




α2(4β2 − γ2 − 2βγ)2
32β(β + γ)(β − γ)(2β2 − γ2)
.
On the other hand, if Mi deviates by hiding his contract, retailers distributing brand j spot such
a deviation since they can no longer observe Mi’s contract. Mi’s deviation then entails wi = 0




α2β(4β2 − γ2 − 2βγ)2
4β(β + γ)(β − γ)(2β − γ)2(2β + γ)2,
which is lower than Π
D,ob
ET . By the same token, one can easily check that if collusion is organized
in such a way that at least one manufacturer hides his contract, the deviation proﬁt of this ﬁrm
is always larger than Π
D,ob
ET . Thus, the deviation proﬁt is given by Π
D,ob
ET .
As a consequence, both manufacturers optimally choose public contracting, and so the critical
discount factor is again given by
δET =
(4β2 − γ2 − 2βγ)2
32β3(β − γ) − 12βγ2(β − γ) + γ4.
Finally, suppose that Mi distributes via exclusive territories, while Mj does not. We can then
perform the same analysis as in the case in which both distribute via exclusive territories. It is
readily shown that Mi—the manufacturer distributing via exclusive territories—chooses to make
his contract public in the stage game, in the collusive phase and also when deviating. Instead,
Mj—the manufacturer allowing for intrabrand competition—is indiﬀerent in any phase. Hence,
the critical discount factor in this case is the same as that determined in Section 4, i.e.,
δAS =
(2β2 − γ2)(8β2 − 4βγ − γ2)
32β4 − 16β3γ − 24β2γ2 + 8βγ3 + 3γ4.
Therefore, the statement of the proposition follows directly from the proof of Proposition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 6. We start with the stage game. In the case of lack of commitment
manufacturers have three diﬀerent choice variables, i.e., the mode of distribution—exclusive or
35non-exclusive territories—whether to make the contract observable or not, and the wholesale
contracts (wi,Ti).
Suppose ﬁrst that both manufacturers impose exclusive territories and disclose their contracts.
The proﬁt of a manufacturer in this case is given by (5). Moreover, from the proof of Proposition
5, we know that deviating to secret contracting is not proﬁtable. However, a manufacturer can
now deviate by choosing non-exclusive territories. Suppose that Mi does so and chooses to make
his contract observable. Given the pair of wholesale prices (wi,wj), from the analysis of the
asymmetric case studied in Section 4 we know that retail prices are
pi = wi and pj (wi,wj) =
α(β − γ) + βwi + γwj
2β
.
Since Mj does not deviate, he sets a per-unit wholesale price of
wj =
αγ2(β − γ)
β(4β2 − γ2 − 2βγ)
,
that was given by (4). After calculating the retail quantities we can write the proﬁt function of
manufacturer i as
Πi (wi) =
wi(2β2 − γ2(4αβ(β − γ) − wi(4β2 − γ2 − 2βγ)))
2β(4β2 − γ2 − 2βγ)(β + γ)(β − γ)
. (A8)
Maximizing this with respect to wi yields
wi =
2αβ(β − γ)
4β2 − γ2 − 2βγ
.
Inserting this price into (A8) yields a proﬁt that is the same as the one in (5). Thus, by deviating
to non-exclusive territories and observable contracts, a manufacturer does as well as with sticking
to exclusive territories and observable contracts. Hence, he has no incentive to deviate.
By the same token, we can check whether a manufacturer can gain by deviating to non-
exclusive territories and non-observable contracts. Doing so yields a proﬁt of
16α2β3(2β2 − γ2)2(β − γ)
(4β2 − γ2 − 2βγ)2(β + γ)(2β − γ)2(2β + γ)2,
which is strictly lower than (5). Hence, this deviation is not optimal and there exists an equilib-
rium of the stage game where both manufacturers impose exclusive territories and disclose their
contracts. As mentioned in the proof of Proposition 4, there cannot exist a stage game equi-
librium where one or both manufacturers chooses exclusive territories and keep their contracts
secret. This is because opting for a public contract yields larger proﬁts.
Next, consider the case where both manufacturers distribute via non-exclusive territories and
make their contracts public. The proﬁt in this case is given by (12). We know that deviating to
private contracts yields the same proﬁt in this case. Suppose now that Mi deviates and chooses
to distribute via exclusive territories. Here it does not matter if he makes the wholesale contract
observable or not because the retailers distributing brand j set pj = wj. We know that Mj sets
a wholesale price of wj = α(β − γ)/(2β + γ). Calculating the optimal deviation wholesale price





(2β − γ)2(β + γ)
,
which is the same as the one given by expression (12). Thus, no manufacturer can gain by deviat-
ing which implies that there also exists an equilibrium of the stage game in which manufacturers
allow for intrabrand competition and disclose their contracts. By the same logic we obtain that
both manufacturers imposing non-exclusive territories and both or just one of them make the
contract not observable is also a Nash equilibrium of the stage game yielding the same proﬁt as
in (12).
Finally, one can show that there does not exist an asymmetric equilibrium of the stage game
where manufacturers distribute with diﬀerent distribution channels. This is because, as seen
above, the manufacturer who allows for intrabrand competition can gain by imposing exclusive
territories.
Summing up, the stage game with lack of commitment features two equilibria: one in which
both manufacturers impose exclusive territories and disclose their contracts, and one where both
allow for intrabrand competition and either make contracts public or private. The upstream
proﬁt in the ﬁrst type of equilibrium is given by (5), in the second type of equilibrium it is given
by (12). The diﬀerence between (5) and (12) is given by
α2β(β − γ)(32β3(β − γ) + 12βγ3 − 8β2γ2 − γ4)
(4β2 − γ2 − 2βγ)2(β + γ)(2β − γ)2(β + γ)
which is positive since β > γ. Thus, the harsher punishment is the one in which ﬁrms play
non-exclusive territories in the stage game.
Next, consider collusion. In the analysis in Section 4 we have seen that if manufacturers
collude via exclusive territories and observable contracts, they set a per-unit price of wi = αγ/(2β)
for i = 1,2. Moreover, from the proof of Proposition 5 we also know that if a manufacturer





α2(4β2 − γ2 − 2βγ)2
32β(β + γ)(β − γ)(2β2 − γ2)
. (A9)
Suppose instead that the manufacturer deviates by setting non-exclusive territories and public
contracts. His optimal deviation wholesale price in this case is given by
wi =
α(4β2 − γ2 − 2βγ)
4(2β − γ2)
leading also to a deviation proﬁt of (A9). One can easily check that the deviation proﬁt with
non-exclusive territories and private contracts is strictly lower. Thus, in this case the largest
deviation proﬁt is given by (A9).
Now suppose that both manufacturers distribute via non-exclusive territories. From Proposi-
tion 3 we know that in this case it does not matter if contracts are public or private. Therefore,
the proﬁt that the deviant manufacturer earns when he keeps allowing for intrabrand competition


















32β(β + γ)(β − γ)(2β2 − γ2)
> 0.
Thus, the deviation proﬁt if both manufacturers distribute via non-exclusive territories is larger
and so it cannot be optimal that both manufacturers choose this mode of distribution.
Finally, when manufacturers choose asymmetric distribution networks, one can show that the
deviation proﬁt of the manufacturer imposing exclusive territories is larger than Π
D,ET
ET . Hence,
manufacturers optimally collude by way of exclusive territories and public contracts.
We can now calculate the critical discount factor δ above which collusion can be sustained if
manufacturers are not committed to their distribution mode. This critical discount factor solves






α2(4β2 − γ2 − 2βγ)2










16β2(2β − γ)(β − γ) + γ4.
Comparing this discount factor with δET yields
δET − δ =
(32β2γ(4β − 3γ)(2β2 − γ2)(β − γ)2
(4β(β − γ)(8β2 − 3γ2)(β − γ) + γ4)(16β2(2β − γ)(β − γ) + γ4)
> 0.
Therefore, with lack of commitment collusion is easier sustain relative to the case where
distribution modes are chosen once and for all. 
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof follows the same lines as the analysis developed with perfect
intrabrand competition. First, if both manufacturers distribute by way of exclusive territories,
the analysis remains unchanged since there is no intrabrand competition. Thus, the critical
discount factor is still equal to δET derived in (9).
However, if both manufacturers have two retailers, the analysis changes. In this case calculat-
ing the Nash-proﬁt of a manufacturer in the stage game, i.e., the punishment proﬁt that follows
a deviation, we obtain
ΠN
NE =
α2β(β(1 + σ) − 2γ)(β2(2 + σ − σ2) − 2γ2)(β2(2 + 3σ − σ3) − 2γ2(3 − σ))
2(β(1 + σ) + 2γ)(β3(2 + 3σ − σ3) − β2γ(2 + σ − σ2) − 2γ2(2β − γ))
2 .




2(β(1 + σ) + 2γ)
.




β3(2 + 3σ − σ3) − β2γ(2 + σ − σ2) − 2γ2(2β − γ)
2
2β(β(1 + σ) + 2γ)(β(1 + σ) − 2γ)(β2(2 + σ − σ2) − 3γ2)(β2(2 + 3σ − σ3) − 2γ2(3 − σ))
.
38So, the critical discount factor δNE can be written as
ˆ δNE =
 





η (σ,β,γ) ≡ 2β5(2 − σ)2(1 + σ)3 (β(1 + σ) − 2γ)−
−β3γ2(2 − σ)(1 + σ)(β(1 + σ)(14 + σ) − 4γ(7 + σ)) + 4γ4β(β(5 + σ) − 2γ(5 − σ)) + 4γ6.
It is easy to check that for σ = 1 the critical discount factor is the same as the one obtained
in our previous analysis, i.e., ˆ δNE = δNE = (2β − γ)2/(8β(β − γ) + γ2). We can now compare
ˆ δNE with δET. We know from the previous analysis that for σ = 1 the diﬀerence between ˆ δNE
and δET is positive. Now, evaluating this diﬀerence at the lower-bound σ = γ/β we obtain
ˆ δNE −δET =
γ2(β − γ)(4β2 + 3γ2)(12β3 − 4β2γ − 11βγ2 + γ3)
(8β4 + 24β3γ − 2β2γ2 − 28βγ3 + 7γ4)(32β4 − 32β3γ − 12β2γ2 + 12βγ3 + γ4)
> 0.
Thus, also in this case collusion is easier to sustain under exclusive territories. Diﬀerentiating
the above diﬀerence with respect to σ we obtain
sign
(




with ϕ(β,σ,γ) being equal to
 
β2(2 + σ(1 − σ)) − 2γ(β(1 − σ) + γ)
 
β3(2 + σ(3 − σ2)) − β2γ(2 + σ(1 − σ)) − 2γ2(2β + γ)

.
One can then readily check that ∂(ˆ δNE − δET)/∂σ < 0 for all σ ∈ (γ/β,1]. Hence, exclusive
territories facilitate collusion. Moreover, this also implies that the pro-collusive eﬀect of exclusive
territories becomes larger the less intense intrabrand competition is. 
Proof of Proposition 8. We ﬁrst look at the case in which both manufacturers distribute via
exclusive territories. In the downstream stage the proﬁt of a retailer distributing brand i is
πi(qi,qj,ei,ej) = (pi − wi)








i, i,j = 1,2,i 6= j.
Maximizing this expression with respect to pi and ei for both retailers, solving for the optimal
price and eﬀort levels, and inserting it back into the proﬁt function, we obtain that the (net)
proﬁt and quantity of retailer i is given by
πi(wi,wj) =
βk(β(2βk − 1) − 2γ2k)
 
k(2β2 − γ2)(α − wi) − β(α − wi + γk(α − wj))
2






k(2β2 − γ2)(α − wi) − β(α − wi + γk(α − wj))

(β(2βk − 1) − γk(β + γ))(β(2βk − 1) + γk(β − γ))
, (A11)
39respectively.29 Manufacturer i’s problem can then be written as
Πi(wi,wj) = wiqi(wi,wj) + πi(wi,wj),
where πi(wi,wj) and qi(wi,wj) are given by (A10) and (A11), respectively. Maximizing this with
respect to wi and using symmetry, we obtain that the Nash equilibrium wholesale price under
exclusive territories is given by30
wN
ET =
αkγ2(β(βk − 1) − γ2k)
β (4β3k − 2β2k(2 − γk) + β(1 − γk(1 + 3γk)) + γ2k(1 − γk))
.
This gives a manufacturer’s proﬁt of
ΠN
ET =
α2k(β(βk − 1) − γ2k)(4β2k(βk − 1) + β(1 − 4γ2k2) + γ2k)
2(4β3k − 2β2k(2 − γk) + β(1 − γk(1 + 3γk)) + γ2k(1 − γk))
2.
Turning to the case of collusion we can calculate the collusive wholesale price and the collusive




β(2k(β + γ) − 1)
(A12)




2(2k(β + γ) − 1)
. (A13)
for the collusive proﬁt of a manufacturer.
To determine the deviation proﬁt we insert wj = wN
C given by (A12) into the proﬁt function
of manufacturer i. Maximizing Πi with respect to wi then yields
wD
ET =
αγ2k(β(βk − 1) − γ2k)
 
4β3k2 − 2β2k(2 − γk) + β(1 − γk(1 + 3γk)) + γ2k(1 − γk)

β(β(2βk − 1) − γ2k)(2k(β + γ) − 1)(4β2k(βk − 1) + β(1 − 4γ2k2) + γ2k)





4β3k2 − 2β2k(2 − γk) + β(1 − γk(1 + 3γk)) + γ2k(1 − γk)
2
2(β(2βk − 1) − γ2k)(2k(β + γ) − 1)2 (4β2k(βk − 1) + β(1 − 4γ2k2) + γ2k)
.
We can now determine the critical discount factor above which collusion can be sustained if both








29Due to our assumption on k given by (16) the Hessian matrix of a retailer’s problem is negative deﬁnite. Thus,
we indeed calculated a maximum.
30Since k > ¯ k, the second-order conditions are fulﬁlled here as well.
40with
ξ ≡ 32β5k3(k(β + γ) − 2) + 4β4k2(12(1 − γk) − 11γ2k2) − 4β3k(4 − γk(6 + 15γk − 11γ2k2))+
+β2(2−γk(4+27γk−38γ2k2−13γ3k3))+βγ2k(1−γk)(2(1−γk)−7γ2k2)+γ4k(2−2γk(2−γk)).
It is easy to check that in the limiting case as k → ∞, this discount factor approaches (4β2 −
2βγ − γ2)2/((32β3 − 12γ2β)(β − γ) + γ4), which is the critical discount factor without eﬀort
provision.
Consider now the case in which both manufacturers distribute via non-exclusive territories.
Since retailers price at marginal costs and make zero proﬁts, it is evident that the free-riding
problem prevents retailers from exerting any eﬀort in this case. As a consequence, all proﬁts are
the same as in the case in which eﬀort plays no role. Thus, the critical discount factor is the




8β(β − γ) + γ2.
Finally, consider the asymmetric regime. In the same way as above we can determine the optimal
eﬀort level of the retailer whose brand is distributed via exclusive territories, and the resulting
prices and proﬁt levels under collusion, deviation and punishment for both manufacturers. Here
we obtain that the lowest discount factor above which collusion can be sustained is given by
˜ δAS =
(β(2βk − 1) − γ2k)(2β(4βk − 1 − 2γk) − γ2k)
8β3k(2k(2β − γ) − 3) + 4β2(1 + 2γk(1 − 3γk)) + βγ2k(7 + 8γk) + 3γ4k2.
We can now compare the three discount factors with each other. We start with a comparison
of δNE and ˜ δET. Solving δNE − ˜ δET = 0 for k we obtain that there are four roots for k which
are given by
k1 =
2β2 − γ2 + 2βγ +
p
4β4 + γ4 + 4βγ3
4γ(β2 − γ2)
, k2 =
2β2 − γ2 + 2βγ −
p




6β2 − γ2 +
p
4β4 + γ4 + 12β2γ2 − 8γβ3
4(4β3 − 3βγ2 + 2β2γ)
and k4 =
6β2 − γ2 +
p
4β4 + γ4 + 12β2γ2 − 8γβ3
4(4β3 − 3βγ2 + 2β2γ)
.
Comparing each of these roots with ¯ k, it is easy to check, that only k1 is larger than ¯ k. Thus,
the other three roots are not valid for the parameter range under consideration. Hence, we can
ignore them. Since we know that ˜ δET < δNE for k → ∞ and there is only one solution to the
equation δNE − ˜ δET = 0 for k ∈ (¯ k,∞), we know that for k > (<)k1, ˜ δET < (>)δNE.
Pursuing a similar analysis for the comparison between δNE and ˜ δAS, we obtain




It is easy to see that β/γ(β − γ) > k1. Thus, it follows that for all k < k1, the critical discount
factor in case where both ﬁrms distribute via non-exclusive territories is the lowest one.
Finally, comparing ˜ δET with ˜ δAS we know that for k between β/γ(β−γ) and k1 one has ˜ δET <
˜ δAS. This is the case because in this region ˜ δET < δNE, but ˜ δAS > δNE. Now diﬀerentiating
˜ δET −˜ δAS with respect to k, one can check that for all k > k1 this diﬀerence is strictly decreasing
in k. But since ˜ δET < ˜ δAS at k = k1, it follows that for all k > k1, ˜ δET < ˜ δAS also holds. 
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